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EvidenceCorner | Leading Questions
Rule 611(c)

Where you lead, I will follow
By Cynthia Ford

“Where you lead, I will follow
Anywhere that you tell me to
If you need, you need me to be with you
I will follow where you lead…”
— Carole King, “Where You Lead”

The tendency of the led to follow the leader is exactly the
point of MRE 611(c), which provides:
Leading questions. Leading questions should
not be used on the direct examination of a witness
except as may be necessary to develop the witness’
testimony. Ordinarily leading questions should
be permitted on cross-examination. When a
party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party,
or a witness identified with an adverse party,
interrogation may be by leading questions.
This rule is identical in substance to FRE 611(c), which in its
restyled version reads:
Leading Questions. Leading questions should
not be used on direct examination except as
necessary to develop the witness’s [NOTE THE
DIFFERENCE IN APOSTROPHE PLACEMENT
FROM MRE VERSION] testimony. Ordinarily,
the court should allow leading questions:
(1) on cross-examination; and
(2) when a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse
party, or a witness identified with an adverse
party.
The objection which enforces this rule is, of course, familiar
to all of us: “Objection, Your Honor, Leading.” An inquisitive
reader of an earlier column suggested this subject, with a
particular emphasis on two specific issues: the purpose behind
the “no leading on direct” rule and how to tell a leading from a
non-leading question. My experience teaching Evidence and
coaching the University of Montana Trial Team, as well as my
own trial experience, confirms that these are valid concerns
worthy of our attention this month.

THE PURPOSE BEHIND THE
“NO-LEADING ON DIRECT” RULE
The Federal Advisory Committee Note to FRE 611(c)
explains that:
The rule continues the traditional view
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that the suggestive powers of the leading
question are as a general proposition
undesirable. [Emphasis added]
The Montana Commission Comment to MRE 611(c) notes
that the Montana version is identical to the then-current FRE
611(c), and expresses Montana’s agreement with the purpose of
the rule:
It recognizes the traditional view that leading
questions, that is, questions which suggest the
desired answer, are generally undesirable
on direct examination, for the witness “
... may acquiesce in a false suggestion”.
McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Evidence 8
(2d ed. 1972). [Emphasis added]
The U.S. Supreme Court, affirming a decision in an
admiralty case which disregarded the thrust of one of the key
witnesses, noted:
A refusal to credit the uncorroborated
testimony of the director-partner, who obviously
was not disinterested in the outcome of the
litigation, would not be considered clearly
erroneous. … This is especially so when such
testimony is prompted by leading questions as
was the case here.5 [FN 5: “At one point the judge
interrupted the direct examination of the witness
to point out he could not ‘give any credit to a
witness answering leading questions.’]
Guzman v. Pichirilo, 369 U.S. 698, 702-03, 82
S. Ct. 1095, 1098, 8 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1962).
My own explanation is that when you have a witness
“friendly” to your side of the case, that witness will necessarily
be like Carole King, happy to go anywhere you suggest. The
lawyer is providing the information, and the witness is just
replying “Yes” or “Exactly” or “That’s right.” It is certainly
true that this method of examination is the quickest, most
efficient, and easiest for both the lawyer and the agreeable
witness. It is equally true that the lawyer cannot testify. First,
the Montana Rules of Professional Conduct forbid an attorney
from testifying at trial.1 Moreover, because the lawyer did
EVIDENCE, next page
1 Rule 3.4(e) states that a lawyer “shall not … assert personal knowledge of facts
in issue except when testifying as a witness…” Rule 3.7 is entitled “Lawyer as Witness” and generally provides that “a lawyer shall not act as an advocate at a trial
in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness” although there are some
limited exceptions to this prohibition.
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not herself perceive the event at issue, she cannot provide the
proper information to the court. MRE 602 requires that every
non-expert witness have “personal knowledge of the matter.”
The witness on the stand, not the lawyer at the podium, has
personal knowledge and must communicate it to the jury as his
own memory and wording dictate.

HOW TO TELL LEADING FROM NON-LEADING
QUESTIONS: “YES OR NO” IS NOT ENOUGH
If the questioning is on direct examination of a witness
friendly to the proponent, the objection should be sustained
if the question is, in fact, leading. A bit mysteriously, neither
the state nor federal version of Rule 611(C) provides any
definition of either type of question. Luckily for Montanans,
our legislature has enacted a statute which defines evidentiary
terms:
26-1-101. General definitions. (1) “Direct
examination” is the first examination of a witness
on a particular matter. “Cross-examination” is the
examination of a witness by a party other than the
direct examiner.
(3) A “leading question” is a question which
suggests to the witness the answer which the
examining party desires.2
The Montana Supreme Court recently elaborated on the
statutory definition, looking to California for guidance, and
concluded that the fact that a question can be answered simply
“Yes” or “No” does not make it leading. The touchstone,
instead, is whether the examiner indicates to the witness how
she is to answer, suggesting that “yes” is the correct answer or
that “no” is not.
In State v. Lindberg, 347 Mont. 76, 196 P.3d 1252, 2008
MT 389, the defendant was convicted of several illegal sexual
activities with young members of his girlfriend’s household.
One of these was a sexual intercourse without consent charge
involving alleged victim H.B. who was 20 at the time of trial.
After he was convicted, Lindberg claimed ineffective assistance
of counsel for failure to object to leading questions posed on
direct to H.B.:
¶ 12 … During her first testimony, H.B., then
approximately twenty years of age, struggled when
recounting Lindberg’s alleged acts and repeatedly
broke down in tears. The District Court recessed
for the day, and resumed the next morning with
her testimony. However, H.B. continued to have
difficulty completing her testimony. The District
Court allowed her to be excused and received
testimony from A.T. and B.B. before again
2 At the time the MRE were written, the Commission noted that 611(c) was consistent with existing Montana law: “Section 93-1901-5, R.C.M. 1947 [26-1-101],
provides:
A question which suggests to the witness by the answer which the examining
party desires is denominated a leading or suggestive question. On a direct examination, leading questions are not allowed, except in the sound discretion of the
court, under special circumstances making it appear that the interest of justice
requires it.”
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having H.B. return to the stand. At this point,
the State began using leading questions to elicit
testimony from her. Lindberg’s counsel objected
twice throughout the examination. On the first
occasion, Lindberg’s counsel objected on the
grounds that all the questions used were leading
questions. The District Court overruled the
objection. Later in H.B.’s testimony, Lindberg’s
counsel again objected stating “Your honor,
I would3 object. Continuing leading—a lot of
leading questions here.” The District Court
denied the objection stating: “This one’s not.”
At the very end of her direct examination, the
State asked H.B. the following question: “At any
time during the 1995 through 1998 incidents
did the defendant penetrate your vagina?” H.B.
responded “Yes.” Lindberg’s counsel did not
object to this question.
¶ 13 After H.B. concluded her testimony,
Lindberg’s trial counsel moved to strike it
completely on the grounds that it had been
developed through the use of leading questions.
The motion was denied. Lindberg’s counsel
also moved for a mistrial on the same grounds.
However, when the District Court requested
authority in support of Lindberg’s motion,
Lindberg’s trial counsel could not provide any.
The District Court denied the motion for a
mistrial.
Lindberg asserts that the only evidence that
he penetrated H.B. came in response to a leading
question from the prosecution to which his trial
counsel did not object. (See ¶ 12). Without this
leading question and H.B.’s response, Lindberg
argues he would have been entitled to a directed
verdict on the sexual intercourse without consent
charge because penetration is a necessary element
of that offense, and, aside from H.B.’s answer
to the leading question, no other evidence was
provided. Lindberg also notes that the jury
seemingly recognized the State’s difficulty in
proving the elements of sexual intercourse
without consent. During its deliberations, the jury
sent a question to the court asking “Did [H.B.]
actually speak the word ‘penetration’ or was it
posed as a yes or no question?” Additionally,
the jury asked if it would be possible to have
a transcript of H.B.’s testimony. However, the
District Court declined to provide an answer or
a transcript, requiring the jury to rely on its own
memory and notes. (Emphasis added.)
347 Mont. at 80- 89.
EVIDENCE, next page
3 My own grammatical view is that when someone says, “I would like to object”
the judge should respond, “Then do so.” The use of the subjunctive does not technically indicate that the speaker is objecting. Perhaps I am getting old and cranky?
At any rate, I recommend that you stick with the clearer and more direct “Objection” or, at most, “I object.”
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On appeal, the Supreme Court discussed the definition
of a “leading question” and then applied it to the penetration
question asked of H.B.:
A review of the trial transcripts demonstrates
that the prosecutor did indeed employ some
leading questions in his examination of H.B.
Lindberg’s ineffective assistance of counsel
claim as to the leading question matter centers
solely, however, on the notion that the specific
question “At any time during the 1995 through
1998 incidents did the defendant penetrate
your vagina?” is a leading question, and that his
counsel’s performance was deficient in failing to
object to it. We are unconvinced that, from an
objective standpoint, this is in fact a leading
question which would have been disallowed by
the District Court upon proper objection.
¶ 45 Section 26–1–101(3), MCA, defines
a “leading question” as “a question which
suggests to the witness the answer which the
examining party desires.” M.R. Evid. 611 provides:
“Leading questions should not be used on direct
examination of a witness except as may be
necessary to develop the witness’ testimony.” …
whether or not leading questions will be allowed is
a matter within the trial court’s discretion.
¶ 46 In People v. Williams, 16 Cal.4th 635,
66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752 (1997), the
California Supreme Court stated that “[a]
question calling for a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer
is a leading question only if, under the
circumstances, it is obvious that the examiner
is suggesting that the witness answer the
question one way only, whether it be ‘yes’ or
‘no.’ ” Williams, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d
at 774 (quotations omitted). The fact that the
specific question to which Lindberg now objects
on appeal is one which could be answered with
a “yes” or “no” does not, ipso facto, make the
question a leading question. In order to establish
deficient performance and prejudice, Lindberg
must show that the prosecution instructed or
suggested to H.B. how the question should be
answered, and further that, had the objection
been timely made, the District Court would
have concluded that the question was leading
and would be disallowed. Lindberg has failed to
establish either matter. Because the question was
arguably not leading and because the allowance
of leading questions is in any event a matter
within the trial court’s discretion, we cannot
say from a standpoint of objective reasonableness
that counsel’s performance in failing to object
to this question was deficient, or that Lindberg
was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object.
Page 18

(Emphasis added)
347 Mont. at 90-91.
In an earlier case, before the adoption of Rule 611(c), the
Montana Supreme Court also held an objected-to question
to be non-leading and thus allowable. The defendant was
charged with assault with a pistol during a mining altercation in
Jefferson County. The prosecutor called the victim:
Defendant’s first assignment of error is based
upon the ruling of the court upon the question
propounded by the county attorney to the
prosecuting witness: “Q. Were you afraid he
might shoot you if you didn’t?” Appellant insists
that the question propounded to the witness was
leading and suggested the answer desired. One
of the ingredients of the crime of assault in the
second degree is as to whether the complaining
witness was actually put in fear of immediate
bodily injury, and that the circumstances of the
case were such as ordinarily will induce such
fear in the mind of a reasonable man. We do not
see how a question could be framed to elicit the
answer of the witness as to his fear of immediate
bodily injury, which would be less objectionable
than the question propounded to the witness
in this case. If the question had been put in the
alternative, as to whether or not the witness
was actually afraid of the defendant doing him
bodily harm if he did not obey the orders of the
defendant, the courts generally would approve
such a question. The question propounded could
be answered “Yes” or “No,” but the witness said,
in answer to the question, “That is what I thought,
if I didn’t.” The question was not leading.
(Emphasis added)
State v. Karri, 84 Mont. 130, 276 P. 427, 428-29
(1929).
So, “You were at the scene, yes or no?” is not leading. “You
were at the scene, weren’t you?” is leading. But both forms of
this question seek preliminary information, so even the leading
version should probably go without objection, because it helps
develop the witness’s testimony.
When you get to the guts of the case, though, you have to
be much more careful and your opponent should be alert to,
and make, the objection “Leading.” Both of these questions are
leading and the objection should be sustained:
“You saw the defendant, David Dastardly, there, didn’t
you?”
“And he raised the gun and shot Vanessa Victim?”
The lawyer here is clearly not just suggesting the answer, but
in fact giving it.
The non-leading way to get the information is much slower
and less efficient, but complies with the personal knowledge
requirement of Rule 602:
“Did you see anyone at the scene?” “Yes.”
“Whom did you see?” “A guy named David Dastardly, who
EVIDENCE, next page
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was talking to a woman.”
“How did you know who he was?” “We used to play city
league softball on the same team.”
“Are you sure of your identification of David?” “Absolutely.”
“What happened next?” “David pulled out a gun and shot
the woman.”

TIPS FOR LEADING
AND NON-LEADING QUESTIONS
The easiest way to comply with both the statutory definition
and the purpose of Rule 611(c), is to get from the witness his
or her own recollection of the matter in his or her own words.
You should use journalistic wording in your questions to do just
that:
“Who….”
“What….”
“When…”
“Where….”
“Why….”
“How…”
If we were making a movie, on direct the spotlight should be
on the witness. The lawyer’s only role is a short question, out of
the view of the camera. The jury’s attention is on the witness,
who is the person who knows “Who [did] What When, Where
and Why.” If we were to graph out the Q and A, it should be
like this:

witness is relegated to agreeing (or not) with the substantive
statements the lawyer makes as part of the question. Cross
should graph out like this:
Q. _____________________________________ , right?4
A. Yes.
Q. And you agree that __________________________ ?
A. Yes.
Q. ____________________________________, correct?
A. Yes.
The cardinal rule when leading is to LEAD! Don’t turn the
reins over to the witness, who is by definition the friend of
your opponent. As soon as she can disagree with you, she will.
Worse, as soon as you give her a chance to run, she will. The
predicates of the questions which you can and should ask on
direct can be fatal on cross.
Example:
Q. You weren’t there at Joan’s house that
night, were you?
A. No.
Q. You were across the river, right?
A. Yes.
Q. Your own house is across the river from
Joan’s?
A. Yes.

Q. __________________________________________

Q. About one hundred feet away?

A. ___________________________________________
_____________________________________________
_____________________________________________

Q. And it was dark?

A. Yes.

A. It was.
The questions are short, just enough to get the witness to
Q. How could you see Joan shoot Vivian?
understand what part of the story she should tell now. The
[Ouch! Here it comes!]
answers explain to the jury what the witness saw or heard or
A. Well, I had just finished serving in the
tasted or felt or smelt (personal knowledge). Therefore, the
SEALS, and I had bought my own night-vision
witness answers at length, describing what she knows to the
binoculars. I was outside trying them out. I am
jury.
not proud of this, but I was kind of spying on Joan
One of my favorite trial-teaching scenes is from the pilot
because I thought she was pretty attractive. I had
episode of the (sadly discontinued) TV series “Conviction.”
crept right up to the riverbank on my side and
A budding prosecutor is sent to court on her first solo trial.
climbed a tree so I was looking right at her dock. I
Within her first few questions of her first witness, the judge says
could see what happened clear as a bell.
“Sustained.” She turns to him and says “Your Honor, there
was no objection.” He responds that he objected, and then
Don’t you wish you had just left it at “It was dark?”
instructs the bailiff: “Tell her.” The bailiff says “No leading on
direct.” She says “Of course” and immediately resumes leading.
WHY CAN WE LEAD ON CROSS?
The judge interrupts again, and the bailiff says, “Just ask ‘What
Rule 611(c), both in Montana and the federal system,
happened next’”. The lawyer tries that, and it works. She is
explicitly
allows leading questions on cross-examination:
stumped for her next question, quiet for a minute, and then tries
again: “What happened next?” It works every time, for her and “Ordinarily leading questions should be permitted on crossexamination.” The federal drafters explained that this simply
for us.
The opposite is true when we can lead, either because
EVIDENCE, next page
we are doing a true cross-examination or because we have
a special circumstance direct: the witness is having trouble
4 The questions on cross can be longer, because they are actually assertions. Even
so, beware the temptation to make them too long and/or complex. Every part you
communicating the basics, or the witness is an adverse party
add to a single question raises the chance the witness could disagree. More imporor associated with the adverse party (his mom), or the witness
tantly, if you have several good points, it is more persuasive to make them one at a
manifests hostility. Now, the lawyer is on center stage, and the
time than to pile them all together.
www.montanabar.org
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continued a long-standing tradition:
The rule also conforms to tradition in making the use of
leading questions on cross-examination a matter of right.
The purpose of the qualification “ordinarily” is to furnish a
basis for denying the use of leading questions when the crossexamination is cross-examination in form only and not in fact,
as for example the “cross-examination” of a party by his own
counsel after being called by the opponent (savoring more of
re-direct) or of an insured defendant who proves to be friendly
to the plaintiff.
Advisory Committee Note to F.R.E. 611(c) (1972). The
Montana Commission Comment is slightly more helpful on the
question of why leading is allowed on cross:
The subdivision also recognizes that leading
questions should ordinarily be allowed on crossexamination because the purpose of crossexamination is to discredit testimony and this
is where leading questions are most effective.
The use of the word “ordinarily” in the second
sentence is intended to allow a court to deny use
of leading questions when cross-examination is in
form only, such as cross-examination of a party
by his counsel after being called as an adverse
witness or of a friendly witness. The use of leading
questions is ultimately a question for the trial
court under Rule 611(a). (Emphasis added)
My own explanation is that when you are doing crossexamination, you “ordinarily” have not called the witness in
your own case, probably because her testimony is not helpful at
the least, and harmful in the worst case scenario, to your case.
The witness has given her story, and knows that you are trying
to poke holes in it. Even if she isn’t particularly associated with
your opponent (she’s not his mom, sister, wife, friend etc.), she
has some pride in the accuracy of her version of the facts. She
will naturally be wary of any suggestion you, her enemy, make.
If the information in your leading question is not strictly true,
she will not be inclined to agree. In essence, she is sitting on
the witness stand with her arms crossed, waiting for a chance to
disagree with you. Instead of being the compliant Carole King,
your witness is Alanis Morissette, singing “Narcissus:”
Dear narcissus boy,
I know you’ve never really apologized for
anything.
I know you’ve never really taken
responsibility.
I know you’ve never really listened to a
woman.

when you are on cross and your opponent objects to your
question as “Leading, Your Honor.” You only have to observe:
“I’m on cross-examination” and the judge should overrule the
objection.

HOW STRICT IS THE RULE?
The Rule itself is rife with possibilities for escape: “except
as necessary to develop the witness’ testimony;” on crossexamination; when the party calls a hostile witness, an adverse
party, or a witness associated with an adverse party. The FRE
Advisory Committee Note to the original version submitted by
the Supreme Court to Congress acknowledged the laxness of
the rule and specifically allowed leading questions to adverse
parties and witnesses associated with them:
Within this tradition, however, numerous
exceptions have achieved recognition: The
witness who is hostile, unwilling, or biased; the
child witness or the adult with communication
problems; the witness whose recollection is
exhausted; and undisputed preliminary matters.
3 Wigmore §§ 774–778. An almost total
unwillingness to reverse for infractions has been
manifested by appellate courts. See cases cited in
3 Wigmore §770. The matter clearly falls within
the area of control by the judge over the mode
and order of interrogation and presentation and
accordingly is phrased in words of suggestion
rather than command. [Emphasis added]
When the Court’s version got to Congress, the House
Judiciary Committee extended the Court’s permissive language
further, to clarify that the ability to use leading questions
applied in both civil and criminal cases, and to “hostile
witnesses” as well as to adverse parties and those associated
with them. (On the other hand, the House added language to
ensure that leading questions could not be used when a witness
was friendly to the questioner, even if the examination itself was
technically a “cross-examination,” such as where one party had
been called on “direct” by her opponent). The Senate Judiciary
Committee was skeptical that the House changes improved
the Court’s proposed rule, but in the end concluded that the
changes were acceptable:
However, concluding that it was not intended
to affect the meaning of the first sentence of the
subsection and was I, intended solely to clarify the
fact that leading questions are permissible in the
interrogation of a witness, who is hostile in fact,
the committee accepts that House amendment.

Long before the FRE and, in particular, Rule 611(c)
were adopted, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the effect
Better not ask her a non-leading question, allowing her to
of leading questions in a case arising in Montana. Alfred J.
launch. Even if you lead, of course, you had better be absolutely Urlin sued the Northern Pacific Railroad for personal injuries
accurate in every part of your question so you can make her
he suffered in a derailment. The jury returned a verdict for
agree with you, because for sure she won’t if she doesn’t have
$7500 (which in 2013 dollars would be $208,350). The railroad
to. Therein lies the guarantee of accuracy in her answers, based appealed, partly because of allegedly leading questions put to
on her own personal knowledge and not the suggestion of the
one of the medical witnesses at trial. Without deciding whether
questioner.
Thus, one of the very easiest objections to overcome is
EVIDENCE, next page
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in fact the question was leading (I don’t think it was), the Court
overruled the error, saying:
The first assignment avers error in permitting
the medical witnesses who testified in behalf of the
plaintiff to be asked whether the examinations
made by them ‘were made in a superficial, or in
a careful and thorough, manner.’ It is urged that
this question was objectionable,… as leading, … It
cannot be safely said that in no case can a court of
errors take notice of an exception to the conduct
of the trial court in permitting leading questions.
But such conduct must appear to be a plain case of
abuse of discretion.‘ We are not aware of any case
in which a new trial has ever been granted for the
reason that leading questions, though objected
to, have been allowed to be put to a witness.’
Green v. Gould, 3 Allen, 466. ‘The allowance of
a leading question is within the discretion of the
court, and is not ground for reversal.’ Insurance
Co. v. Groff, 87 Pa. St. 124. ‘Circuit courts must be
allowed the exercise of a large discretion on the
subject of leading questions.’ Parmelee v. Austin,
20 Ill. 35. (Emphasis added)
N. Pac. R. Co. v. Urlin, 158 U.S. 271, 273, 15 S.
Ct. 840, 841, 39 L. Ed. 977 (1895).
The Montana jurisprudence is similar. MRE 611(c) contains
language generally prohibiting leading questions on direct, but
with specific exceptions for hostile witnesses and those identified
with adverse parties, as well as when “necessary” to develop the
testimony. The Montana cases, discussed more specifically
below, show the same inclination as the federal courts to support
the trial judge in her discretion on this point. The Montana
Commission Comment to 611(c) acknowledged this:
The cases have also indicated that allowing
leading questions where improper is a technical
error and will only rarely be grounds for a
new trial. Hefferlin v. Karlman, supra; State v.
Kanakaris, 54 Mont. 180, 183, 169 P 482 (1917);
and State v. Collett, supra. The cases have also
recognized some of the exceptions to the rule
generally disallowing leading questions on direct
examination. In State v. Spotted Hawk, supra, the
Supreme Court found that when witnesses were
illiterate or unable to speak English, examination
should be allowed by leading questions, a view
affirmed in State v. Collett, supra at 478. In
Hefferlin v. Karlman, supra, the court held it was
within the sound discretion of the trial court to
permit leading questions to establish a foundation,
for it was a preliminary matter. Finally, in State
v. Karri, 84 Mont. 130, 136, 276 P 247 (1929), the
court held it was proper for the prosecution to ask
a leading question which contained specific words
which established an element of the crime.
Thus, both state and federal courts recognize the rule against
www.montanabar.org

leading on direct, but trial courts’ rulings on leading objections
are almost always affirmed on appeal.

MONTANA CASES ON 611(C)
In City of Kalispell v. Miller, 2010 MT 62, the City charged
Miller with obstructing a police officer. Miller had called the
City police dispatcher and reported that her lover, Benware,
was with her at the bar. In fact, Benware had left the bar after
an argument and only 12 minutes before Miller made the call,
had been in an automobile accident. Miller allegedly called to
prevent the police department from responding to a call from
another friend asking for a welfare check on Benware. (Benware
was a city employee and Miller was afraid the welfare check
might cause Benware to lose her job).
At trial, the City prosecutor called Benware as a witness and
asked the Court for permission to treat her as a “hostile” witness
under M.R.E. 611(c). The Court granted the request. On
appeal, Miller argued that Benware was not hostile to the City
and the prosecutor should not have been allowed to use leading
questions to examine her. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial
judge’s decision as within its discretion, commenting:
¶ 27 There is no question that Miller and
Benware had a close association at the time of this
trial however the relationship might have been
characterized for the jury5. Accordingly, under the
text of the rule, interrogation by leading questions
would be permitted because Benware was clearly
“identified with an adverse party.” While the
better course on remand would be for the State to
establish hostility on direct examination before
seeking to treat Benware as hostile, we cannot
conclude under the text of the rule that the court’s
preliminary ruling in this regard was an abuse of
discretion….
¶ 28 …we affirm … the Trial Court’s decision
allowing Benware to be treated as a hostile witness.
In the Miller case, the Court distinguished State v. Anderson,
211 Mont. 272, 686 P.2d 193 (1984). Anderson was charged
with sexually assaulting three young girls, one of whom was his
stepdaughter. The State listed the stepdaughter as a witness,
but did not call her at trial. Anderson then called her in his
defense case, and asked that she be treated as “hostile.” The
trial judge denied the motion until the girl’s testimony revealed
hostility. When she did testify, without leading questions, she
absolved Anderson. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial
judge’s decision to require non-leading questions as within his
discretion.
The Miller court acknowledged, “the well-known exception
to the general provision against leading questions exists when
the witness is a child (see State v. Eiler, 234 Mont. 38, 46, 762
P.2d 210, 215 (1988) and Bailey v. Bailey, 184 Mont. 418, 421,
EVIDENCE, next page
5 Another issue in this case is whether the City should have been allowed to introduce evidence that the relationship between the two women, Miller and Benware,
was an intimate one. The Court divided sharply on this point, holding 4-3 that this
was error and remanding the case for a new trial.
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603 P.2d 259, 261 (1979)),” but distinguished those cases from
Anderson and found that Anderson supported its affirmance of
the trial court decision in Miller:
¶ 26 …In Anderson, despite clear precedent
that a demonstration of hostility was not required
before a child witness could be interrogated with
leading questions, we nonetheless acknowledged a
trial court’s broad discretion to issue such a ruling
and deferred to it. We do so here as well.
In State v. Eiler, 234 Mont. 38, 762 P.2d 210 (1988), the
victim/witness of the alleged sexual abuse was an 8 year old. The
trial judge allowed the prosecution to use leading questions to
examine her, and the Supreme Court affirmed:
In the case on appeal, Dr. Jarvis testified that
S.A. and other children who are involved in sexual
abuse cases, do not want to talk about the incident.
S.A.’s videotaped deposition clearly corroborates
Dr. Jarvis’ expert opinion that child victims of
sexual abuse are reticent witnesses. The trial court
also noted in its memorandum on the competency
issue, “it is noticeably difficult for her to testify
about her experiences, a circumstance which
is understandable and not unusual for a child
witness in this type of case.” We find that there was
no abuse of discretion by the District Court for
allowing leading questions by the prosecution.

was disputed. The judge interviewed the parties’ children in
chambers and then awarded custody to their mother. The father
argued on appeal that the judge erred in asking the youngest
child leading questions (the case does not give the age of that
child). In affirming the award and the procedure, the Supreme
Court quoted from both the Montana Commission Comment
and the Federal Advisory Committee note:
Leading questions may be asked if necessary
to develop testimony, Rule 611(c), Mont.R.Evid.,
and whether or not they will be allowed is a matter
for the trial court’s discretion. See Commission
Comment to Rule 611(c). One of the well known
exceptions to the general provision against
leading questions is when the witness is a child.
Advisory Committee’s Note to Federal Rule 611(c),
(1972), 56 F.R.D. 183, 275. Here, where counsel
noted at oral argument that the youngest child
was rather withdrawn, the asking of leading
questions is not an abuse of discretion. (Emphasis
added).
184 Mont. 421.

CONCLUSION
That was interesting, wasn’t it?
Cynthia Ford is a professor at the University of Montana School of Law
where she teaches Civil Procedure, Evidence, Family Law, and Remedies.

234 Mont. at 46.
State v. Hibbs, 239 Mont. 308, 780 P.2d 182 (1989), involved
two child witnesses who were 6 and 7 years old. The Court here
held that leading questions by the prosecutor were within the
trial court’s discretion, even without the sort of express findings
the trial judge made in Eiler:
Hibbs objected to the leading nature of the
prosecution’s direct examination of two child
victims and argues that the prosecution failed to
establish that leading questions were necessary
to develop the witnesses’ testimony. However, in
Bailey v. Bailey (1979), 184 Mont. 418, 603 P.2d
259, 261, this Court set forth an exception to the
general rule against leading questions on direct
examination where a child witness is involved. The
rationale behind the exception is that questioning
a child is a difficult task. See State v. Eiler
(Mont.1988), 762 P.2d 210, 45 St.Rep. 1710; State
v. Howie (Mont.1987), 744 P.2d 156, 44 St.Rep.
1711. As this Court stated in Eiler, 762 P.2d at 215,
whether or not leading questions will be allowed
is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. See also
Bailey, 603 P.2d at 261. The District Court need
not make express findings that leading questions
are necessary. We hold that the questioning was
proper.
239 Mont. at 312.
Bailey v. Bailey, supra, was a divorce case, in which custody
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